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BANKRXTPTCY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-STATE LAW GovERNs-HAR-
GADINE-McKITTRIcK DRY GOODS Co. v. HUDSON, IO AM. B. R. 225 (MO.).-
A claim was voluntarily filed against a bankrupt's estate and was disallowed
on the ground that it was barred by the Statute of Limitations of the State
where bankruptcy proceedings were pending, although not so barred in the
State where the claim arose. Held, that such disallowance was no error.
There is a conflict in the earlier cases on this point. One line of de-
cisions holding that where the Statute goes to the remedy merely and does
not destroy the obligation, the claim should be allowed. In re Ray, Fed. Cas.
1i,589; In re Shepard, Fed. Cas. 12,753. But the present case follows the
clear weight of authority. In re Kingsley, I Low. 216; In re Cornwall, 9
Blatch. 114. These decisions are based upon the fact that the federal courts
are governed by the Statutes of Limitation in the several States. Bauserman
vs. Blunt, 147 U. S. 654. The recent cases all seem to follow the latter view.
In re Lipman, 94 Fed. 353; In re Resler, 95 Fed. 804. Although strictly an
outlawed debt is within the terms of Sec. 63 of the Bankruptcy Act and
oughit therefore to be allowed to be proved, still the law prevents its proof
on the ground that its allowance against other 'creditors would be inequitable.
Collier, Bankruptcy, 4th ed., 454.
CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGE-MISTAKE OF LAw-RELIEF IN EQUITY.-
SwEDsBoRo LOAN AND BUILDING Ass'N v. GANS Er Al-, 55 ATL. 82.-Held,
that the cancellation of a mortgage through misapprehension or mistake of
law, upon grounds for which it would not have been cancelled but for such
mistake, is good ground for equity to grant relief and re-establish the mort-
gage.
The principle is well founded in England that a mistake, whether of
law or fact, is good ground for equitable relief, Moses v. McFarlan, 2 Bur-
rows 1,oo5; Farmer v. Arundel, 2 Black. 824. In the United States at
the present time the weight of authority is to hold a mistake of law good
ground for equitable- relief, Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Culbreth v.
Culbreth, 7 Ga. 64; Covington v. Powell, 2 Met. (Ky.) 226, though in many
States the contrary is held. Nelson v. Davis, 40 Ind. 366; Smith v. McDoug-.
all, 2 Cal. 586.
CARRIER OF FREIGHT-LIMITATION OF CONTRACT LIABILITY.-BERNSTEIN
v. WEIR, 83 N. Y. SuPP. 48.-A shipper had a book containing freight receipts
of a carrier. He delivered a package to carrier without stating value and
tendered one of the receipts, which he had filled out with consignee's name
and a description of the goods, to their employee, who signed it in his presence
and returned it. There was upon the face of receipt a contract providing
that the carrier was not liable for loss by certain specified causes unless
through fraud or great negligence, and in no case for more than $5o. Held,
that the shipper was bound by the provision upon the face of the receipt
and that he could not recover more than the amount stated therein unless
under the exceptions stated.
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This decision is contrary to those in the following cases . Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry. Co. v. Davis, I6 Brawd. (Ill.) 425; So. Exp. Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss.
822; L. & N. R. Co. v. Owen, 12 Ky. 716, which held that the
acceptor of a bill of lading was not bound by a contract on its face unless
he assented to it. But the weight of authority seems to be in harmony with
this decision in holding that he is bound whether he reads the contract or not.
Leitch v. U. R. R. Trans. Co., Fed. Cas. 8,224; Davis v. Central Vt. R. R. Ca.,
66 Vti 29o; Belger v. Dinsmore, 5I N. Y. 166. He is held even though he
cannot read. Jones v. Cincinnati, S. & M. Ry. Co., 99 Ala. 376.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PowER OF CONGRESS UNDER 15TH AMENDMENT-
VALIDITY OF STATUTE AGAINST WRONGFUL INDIVIDUAL ACTS.-JAMES V.
BROWN, 23 SuP. CT. 678.Held, that a statute which purports to punish
purely individual acts cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of
the power conferred by the I5th amendment upon Congress to prevent denial
of the right of suffrage by a State through some one or more of its official
representatives, and that an indictment which charges no discrimination on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, is likewise destitute
of support by such amendment. Harlan and Brown JJ., dissenting.
The 15th amendment refers specifically to a denial by a State or any
of its agents, of the right of suffrage to qualified citizens. It does not refer
to individual acts and it has been repeatedly held that the words of the
amendment cannot be narrowed to embrace purely individual acts of denial
of suffrage, especially where the allegation does not charge that such acts
were done on account of color, race or previous servitude. United States
v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 85; Strouder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; EX
parte Bradley, 7 Wall 364; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.
CRIMINAL LAw-APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL-COMPENSATION-PAYMENT
BY COUNTY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-PEoPLE EX REL. ACRITELLI V. GROUT,. 84
N. Y. SuPP. 97.-Held, that a statute providing for the compensation of
counsel assigned to defendant in criminal proceeding is not a violation of the
constitutional provision which forbids payment of public money for private
purposes. Ingraham, Van Brunt, JJ., dissenting.
A statute granting compensation to a public official for expenses incurred
in defending himself against a false charge is- unconstitutional. Chapman v.
City of N. Y., 168 N. Y. 8o. The power of the court, however, to assign
counsel to a defendant without means is generally based on public justice
and policy. County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585. It is similar to the duty
to support a pauper. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 17; Chapman v. City of N. Y.,
supra. Some States, even, hold it unconstitutional to refuse to -pay for such
services of coufisel on the ground that it would be taking private property
for public purposes without compensation. Hall v. Washington County, 2
Greene (Iowa) 473. It would seem, then, that since the services of counsel
are for public purpose, payment therefor does not violate the constitution.
EMINENT DOMAIN-MEASURE OF DAMAGEs.-SouTH BUFFALO RY. Co. v.
KzRxovER nT AL., 68 N. E- 366 (N. Y.).-Held, that in condemnation pro-
ceedings by a railroad company, where land is acquired without the owner's
consent, he is entitled to the market value of the part taken and to compensa-
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tion for any damages to the residue, including those sustained by reason of
the use to which the part taken is put.
Although this principle is well established, Wood on Railroads, p. I,O36;
io Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2nd ed.) I165, there is much conflict as
to what elements are to be considertd in the assessment of damages. Appar-
ently a desire of the courts to justly compensate an owner, thus deprived,
against his will, of his land, has led some of them to carry the doctrine too
far. Some courts are disposed to allow assessment for "speculative and
consequential damages"; McReynolds v. R. R., ioo IIl. 152; Bridge Co v.
Geisse, 35 N. J. Law 474; Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 3o. The weight of
authority, however, favors a stricter view, although one rather more liberal
than in ordinary damage suits. Watson v. R. R., 37 Pa. St. 469; Tucker v.
R. R., i18 Mass. 546; Curtis v. R. R., 2o Minn. 28; Clark v. Saybrook, 21
Conn. 313. This case adopts the principle and lends its authority to the
stricter view.
EMINENT DoMAIN-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE UsE-PuBLIc GRIsTmILS.-
GAYLORD V. SANITARY DIST. OF CHICAGO, 68 N. E. 522 (Ir. ).-Held, that
long usage recognizes public gristmills as "public utilities" justifying the
exercise of the power of eminent domain; but other mills have not received
such absolute sanction, and as private enterprises cannot exercise such power.
No mills other than gristmills have any claim to be of a public character.
Harding v. Goodlett, II Tenn. 41. The exercise of the right of eminent
domain is necessarily in derogation of private right, and hence the rule is
that the authority is to be strictly construed. Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. i6.
Contra.-Whether a particular structure is for the public use is a question
for the legislature, and their decision may be presumed correct. And the
establishment of a great mill-power for manufacturing purposes is a recog-
nized public use justifying the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass. 475. Raising of a milldam "for the encourage-
ment of manufactures" is a taking of the lands thereby flowed for a public
use. Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591. The Illinois court seems to have
slighted the economic questions involved.
EQUITY-URISDICTION-RIGHT TO ENJOIN-PENDING ACTION-LEGISLATVE
AUTHORITY-PRACTICE IN EQUITY,-WRIGHT ET AL. V. SUPERIOR COURT ET AL.,
73 PAc. 145 (CAL)-Under the civil code providing that an injunction can-
not be granted to stay a judicial proceeding pending at the' commencement of
the action in which the injunction is demanded, unless to prevent a multi-
plicity of suits, held, that where an action is pending in one superior court,
another superior court has 'no jurisdiction to entertain a bill of discovery
and enjoin proceedings, except as above. Shaw, J., dissenting.
Spreckeli v. Hawaiian Co., 117 Cal. 377, the only case relied on as
authority, holds exactly the contrary, that jurisdiction existed, but under the
law the statement of facts did not entitle to relief. The inconsistency in
the main decision lies in the assumption that because the law deprives the
plaintiff of a right of action, the court is ousted of its jurisdiction. It is
based on the reasoning that the power of courts of equity to grant bills of
discovery has been superseded or made inoperative by giving law courts the
same power. Contra.-People v. Da'vidson, 30 Cal. 391; Rosenberg v. Frank,
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58 Cal. 4oo. While this assumption is supported by Bond v. Worley, 26 Mo.
254; Ex parte Boyd, io5 U. S. 657; and Rindskopf v. Platto (C. C.) 29 Fed.
312, the great weight of authority is to the contrary, Wood v. Hudson, 96 Ala.
469; Grimes v. Hilliary, 38 Ill. App. 246; Union Passenger R. R. Co. v.
Mayor, 71 Md. 238; Elliston v. Hughes, I Head. (Tenn.) 227.
EVIDENCE-ExPERT TESTIMONY-REMAINDERS.-RIcARDs V. SAFE DEPOSIT
AND TRUST Co., 55 ATL. 384 (MD.) .- Held, incompetent to prove by medical
testimony that a married woman 53 years of age was incapable of child-bearing
for the purpose of defeating an estate in remainder.
There are some early English cases which upheld a presumption that a
woman of advanced age was incapable of bearing a child. The more modern
English cases have not adopted this presumption. In re Dawson, L. R. 39
Ch. Div. I55; In re Sayers Trusts., L. R. Exch. 319. No case can be found
in the American courts in which such a presumption has been given effect.
Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, p. 302. If a physician may testify that
because of a physical degeneracy a woman is incapable of bearing children so
that a trust created for her benefit, during her life only, may be brought to
an end and the vesting of a remainder may be defeated, no one can fore-
tell to what lengths such a precedent would lead. The court holding this
to be a case of first impression acted cautiously and with due consideration
of the demoralizing consequences that might follow its decision.
INHERITANCE TAx-VALIDITY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES-UNONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE.-IN RE JOHNSON'S ESTATE,
139 CAL. 532.-A statute imposing a tax on property passing by will "other than
to the use of father, mother, husband, wife, lawful issue, brother or sister," was
amended to include "nieces and nephews, when a resident of this State."
Held, not void as in conflict with the constitutional provision declaring that
citizens of each State shall be entitled to privileges and immunities of the
several States. Beatty, C.J., dissenting.
Overruling Estate of Mahoney, 133 Cal. iSo, which finds authority in
Spraigue v. Thompson, 1i8 U. S. go, and which strikes out the amending
clause as unconstitutional. Although the unconstitutionality of laws imposing
a special tax discriminating against non-residents is clear; Cullman v. Arndt,
125 Ala. 581; and a court, if possible, construes, where an exemption is claim-
ed, in favor of the tax and against the exemption; R. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids,
io2 Mich. 374; nevertheless, by the great weight of authority, beginning
with Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M. (Md.) 554, the courts have held
privileges granted by a State to its citizens to be extended to citizens of the
several States. Sprague v. Fletcher, 64 Vt. 69; The Slaughter House Case,
I6 Wall. 36.
INFANcY-WAGES OF SoN-RIGHTS OF CREDITORS OF FATHER.-WIsNER V.
OSBORN, 55 ATi-. 51 (N. J.).-Held, that the wages earned by an infant
emancipated by his father, though living at home, are not subject to the
claims of the father's creditors.
Absence of fraud must be shown. Elfelt v. Hinch, 5 Ore. 255. Living
at home does not affect the infant's emancipation. Wilson v. McMillan, 62
Ga. 161; Wood on .Master and Servant, p. 3o. The authorities show much
diversity of opinion on this point. Some courts hold that the wages may be
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reached by the father's creditors. Stumbaugh v. Anderson, 46 Kan. 541;
Bell v. Hallenback, I Wright (Ohio) 751. The principal case follows the
weight of authority, Atwood v. Holcomb, 39 Conn. 270; Stanley v. National
Bank, Ii5 N. Y. 122; Wambold v. Vick, 5o Wis. 456. The courts of New
Jersey are unanimous in upholding this decision. Costello v. Prospect Brew-
ing Co., 152 N. J. Eq. 557; Peterson v. Mulford, 36 N. J. Eq. 481.
INsURANcE-APPLICATION-AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO WAIVE PAYMENT OF
PREmiUM.-RussELL V. PRUDENTIAL INS. Co., 68 N. E. 252 (N. Y.).-A
general agent delivered policy to the insured, extending payment of premium
contrary to the provisions of the contract. Held, that, in the absence of proof
of agent's express authority to waive payment, beneficiary could not recover.
Haight, J., dissenting.
The decision is based on the signature by the insured of an application,
subsequently embodied in the policy, making payment of first premium a
condition precedent to its validity. Where there is no previous subscription
to the substantial terms of the contract, the weight of authority is that
agents can waive provisions of policy relative to first payment. Boehen v.
Ins. Co., 35 N. Y. 131; Dunn v. Ins. Co., 69 N. H. 224; Richards on Insur-
ance, p. 93. Acceptance by agent of a note and a further extension after
its maturity has been held to constitute a waiver of cash payment stipulations
in application and policy. Stewart v. Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 257, an opinion
which is based, however, upon the assumption that the company is estopped
from denying a ratification after the lapse of a reasonable period of time.
The dissenting opinion in the present case contends that the ruling of the
majority will result in defrauding the insuring public. It is the prevailing
custom of insurance agents to extend payment of premiums regardless of
contract stipulations. It is also true that the insured generally attaches his
signature to the application under such conditions as to make it impracticable
for him to familiarize himself with all of its terms. In view of these con-
siderations, the dissenting position seems well taken, and is in line with the
decision in Mathews v. Acc. Ass'n, 78 Wis. 588; Jones v. Ins. Co., I68 Mass.
245.
LIFE INSURANCE-PoLIcY-APPLICATION-WARRANTIE--ATHORITY OF
INsuRANcE AGENT.-DimIcK V. METROPOLITAN Lns INs. Co., 55 Am. 291
(N. J.).-Where an insurance company makes the answers in its application
blanks warranties and certain agents of the insurer write answers different
from those given by the applicant, which they know to be false, held, that
such answers constitute a breach of warranty, nullifying the policy.
This is the first case decided where a policy was vitiated through the
writing of false answers by both the insurance and medical solicitors. The
case most nearly in point, Sternaman v..Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y.
i3, holds the contrary, where the medical examiner answered falsely; but
it is not controlling here, since no question was raised concerning the truth
of the solicitor's answers. In the latter cases it has been held that false
answers vitiate the policy; Van Shoick v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 68 N. Y.
434; O'Brien v. Home Benefit Society, II7 N. Y. 310; but the prevailing
authority in New York is otherwise. The decision rests upon the doctrine
that the principal is not bound by acts of the agent in excess of authority.
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Contra, Wood v. American Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 382; Insurance Co. v.
Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222-the latter case being decided on the express ground
that no notice of agent's limitation of authority came to the assured's knowl-
edge, though the weight of authority is contrary. The other ground of the
decision is that parol evidence may not be introduced to vary the effect of a
written contract. Martin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 4o N. J. Law 568.
MANSLAUGHTER-VERDICT-SUFFICIENcY-FORMER JEOPARDY.-MAHANY V.
PEOPLE, 73 PAC. 26, (CoL).-Held, that where a verdict of manslaughter was
void because the jury failed to designate whether it was voluntary or in-
voluntary, as required by statute, but the defendant made no objection to
the discharge of the jury, merely excepting to the verdict in the usual form,
he cannot plead former jeopardy on a subsequent trial.
As to what constitutes jeopardy there are two widely variant rules. The
courts of some States hold that when a person has been" placed on trial on a
valid indictment and the jury has been sworn, he is in jeopardy.
17 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), 584; I Bish., Crim. Law
(5th ed.), ro16. But the greater weight of authority supports
the rule that jeopardy does not attach until a valid verdict, for conviction or
acquittal, has been rendered. U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Sumn. 6o; People v. Good-
win, I8 John., 187; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), 585. The courts
of Colorado follow the latter rule. Two alternative processes of reasoning
are used to justify the granting of a new trial. First: A defective verdict
is a nullity and, therefore, the prisoner never has suffered actual jeopardy.
Kearney v. People, ixi Col. 258; U. S. v. Haskill, 4 Wash. C. C. 409; U. S. v.
Coolidge, 2 Gall. 364; Wharton's Crim. Law, 573-587. Second: A failure
on the part of the prisoner to object to the discharge of the jury and to ask
for a correction of the verdict, involves an implied waiver of the privilege
of subsequently pleading previous jeopardy. This reasoning is equally well
supported. Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286; Murphy v. State, 7 Cold.
(Tenn.) 516; Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. 5o6. Thus, notwithstanding the two
very different rules defining jeopardy, it seems beyond dispute that when a
defective verdict is rendered and the prisoner makes no objection to the
discharge of the jury, he cannot plead former jeopardy at a new trial.
MARTIAL LAW-DUTY OF SoLDIER-HoMIcIDE.-CoMm. ax RFJ. WADs-
WORTH V. SHORTALL, 55 ATL. 952 (PA.).-Held, that where a militiaman,
called out to suppress disorder, without malice, in performance of his duty,
and under orders, commits a homicide, he is excusable, unless he manifestly
exceeded his authority and knew the act to be illegal.
The issue by a governor of a general order, calling out the militia to
maintain order in a certain district, is a declaration of qualified martial law.
This is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 2, that martial law cannot exist in time of
peace. I B1., CoM., 413; Johnson v. lones, 44 Ill. 157.. But many authorities
hold that it exists wherever soldiers are called out to suppress disorder.
However, the necessity must be urgent. Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. I4I;
Koonce v. Davis, 72 N. C. 218; Merritt v. Nashville, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 95.
For acts done in the suppression of public disorder, a commander is liable,
civilly and criminally. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. z15; Milligan v. Hovey,
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3 Biss. 13. A soldier is bound to obey the orders of his superior where they
are not clearly illegal and such orders will be a protection to him. Riggs
v. State, 43 Tenn. 85; Sampson v. Smith, 15 Mass. 365.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SAFE PLACE TO WORK-NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.-
PENN R. R. v. JONES, 123 FED. 753 (PA.).-An employe was killed by the
backing of a train off a stub switch which had no bumper. Held, that failure
to protect the end of the switch rendered the railroad liable for negligence.
Archibald, J., dissenting.
This ruling is directly contradictory to R. R. v. Driscoll, 176 Ill. 33o. But
the general weight of decisions is as above. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Hen-.
nessey, 38 C. C. A. 314 (Ky.). The question is whether such absence of
bumper is a part of the general plan of the road or a defect in the road. A
master need not use the newest and safest appliances. R. R. v. Lonergan,
xi8 Ill. 4. It is for him to decide how railroad shall be built. Tuttle v.
R. R., 122 U. S. i89. On the other hand he must construct the road so that
it may be safe to work upon. Trask v. Cal., etc., R. R., 63 Cal. 96. R. R.
v. Swelt, 45 IIl. 197. He is liable for death of employe between two cars
where buffers failed to meet. Ellis v. R. R., 95 N. Y. 546. These decisions
imply that lack of bumper should be held a defect.
MONOPOLIES-COPYRIGHT-ILLEGAL R-STRICTION OF CoMPETITIoN.STRAuSS
v. AM. PUB. ASS'N, 83 N. Y. SUPP. 271.-Defendants, composed of 95 per
cent. of the book publishers in the United States and Canada, formed a
combination, the purpose of which was to compel all retailers to sell copy-
righted books at a certain price fixed by the association. Held, that, under
the N. Y. Statute (Laws 1899, c. 69o, sec. I) prohibiting contracts creating a
monopoly, the combination was illegal. Van Brunt.. P.J., and McLaughlin,
., dissenting.
This decision is directly contrary to the ruling in Park Co. v. Druggists'
Ass'n, 175 N. Y. I, which held that manufacturers of copyrighted goods can
combine for the purpose of dictating prices at which the articles shall be
sold and of requiring dealers to maintain such prices. The Park case,
however, arose prior to the enactment of the present statute; but the statute
is a substantial codification of the principles of the common law and must
be construed as a continuation thereof. In re Davis, 168 N. Y. 89. This
agreement does not fix the price at which the publishers must sell their books.
They can name the price to the consumer now as they could before, the
validity of a contract between manufacturers and purchasers to sell at a
stipulated price being well determined. Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72;
Fowler v. Park, 131 U. S. 88; Walsh v. Dwight, 40 App. Div. 513. The
decision in the present case would not seem to be maintainable. As the
dissenting justices indicate, it is difficult to comprehend why a seller of
property in respect to which he has a monopoly cannot impose any conditions
as to its resale that he may desire.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-DE FACTO CLERK-PAYMENT OF SALARY-
RIGHT OF DE JURE CLER--MARTIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 68 N. E. 640 (N.
Y.).-Plaintiff, a clerk in municipal employ, was irregularly dismissed, but was
later reinstated by mandamus proceedings. Held, he can not recover salary
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paid to a de facto clerk who performed the duties of the position during the
interval.
The case of Higgins v. The Mayor, 131 N. Y. 128, is directly in point,
and following Terhune v. The Mayor, 8o N. Y. 185, holds that
payment to another who actually did the work is a good defense to such
an action by a municipal corporation. The general rule is to the contrary.
Dillon, Mun. Corps., sec. 235. The salary of a public office is incident to
the title and wrongful payment to a de facto officer is no defense to an action
by a de jure officer. Dorsey v. Smith, 28 Cal. -2z. A municipal corporation
wrongfully removing an officer is liable for his salary. Shaw v. Macon, ig
Ga. 468. The amount of salary received by a de facto officer is the measure
of damages receivable by a de jure'officer for deprivation from office. United
States v. Addison, 6 Wall. 29I.
TITLE To ANIMAL SKINS-BURDEN OF PROoF-PREsuMPTION.-LINDEN V.
McCoRmIcK ET AL., 96 N. W. 785 (MINN.)-Held, that where the plaintiff
purchased deer skins.for commercial purposes, it is to be presumed' the game
Was lawfully killed and the skins came lawfully into his possession.
No previous adjudication of the point involved has been found. It is
probably the first time it has come before the court for determination. Seim
33, chap. 22, Gen. Laws, Minn., declares that no. person can acquire title
to game except by proving the killing of it at the time, and in the manner
authorized. This statute was 'declared constitutional in State v. Rodman, 58
Minn. 393. In the present case the court distinguished between the title to
game and the title to the product thereof, id est, the skins. The burden
of proving that the skins were not legally obtained is on the State. fames
v'. Wood, 82 Me. 173. Thomas v. Northern Pacific Express Co., 73 Minn. 185.
The modern tendency as set forth in this case is, that "a person in good
faith may acquire a valid title to skins of wild animals although the same
may have been killed contrary to law."
USE OF STREETS-ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE-TELEPHONES.-KIRBY v. Cm-
ZENS' TEL. Co., 97 N .W. 3 (S. D.).-Held, that the construction and main-
tenance of a telephone system on the streets of a city in such a manner as
not to cause unnecessary injury is not an additional servitude for which an
abutting property owner is' entitled to compensation.
The decision in the principal case is based upon the principle that tele-
phones are a means of communication. The reasonable use of the striets
of a city for the necessary equipment of a telephone system is not a new
and additional burden for which the abutting property owner is entitled
to compensation. Anerach a. Tel. Co., 70 Ohio N. P. 633. Other courts
hold that telephones were not in contemplation when highways were con-
structed. Pacific Cable Co. v. Irvine, 49 Fed. 113. The construction of a
telephone line is an additional burden for which the abutting owner is entitled
to ompensation. Eels Iv. Am. Tel. Co., 143 N. Y. 133; Board of
Trade v. Barnett, io7 Ill. 5o7; Willis v. Erie Telegraph & Tel. Co., 37 Minn.
347; Stowerson v. Tel. Co., 68 Miss. 559.
WATERCOURSES-SUBTERRANEAN CHANNELS-PERCOLATING WATERS-AD.
JOINING OwNERs-WAsTE-INuNcTioN-BRCaY v. AB.AHAx Er AL, 96 N.
RECENT CASES. 209
W. io8o (IowA.)-Held, that a landowner who dug a well, thereby diverting
percolating waters and cutting off the supply from neighboring wells may
be enjoined from wasting for pure malice the full flow of water thus obtained.
This follows the common law rule. Greenleaf v. Francis, 17 Pick. 117;
Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt.- 49; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528; Frasier v.
Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294. Contra, Huber v. Merkel, .94 N. W. (Wis.) 354,
holding that one is not liable for wasting water drawn from percolations,
and that malice is not a factor even though his acts may stop the flow of
neighboring wells. This is an extreme interpretation of the doctrine that
percolating waters are property. .All other recent decisions tend to qualify
the doctrine of earliest decisions to the extent that even in the absence of
malicious intent, percolating waters may not be used for pure profit, if such
an act diminishes the flow of neighboring wells, to the detriment of their
owners. Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N. W. (Minn.) 9o7; Forbell V.
City of New York, 164 N. Y. 522; Smith v. City of Brooklyn, i6o N. Y. 357.
Reason in the use of the property seems to be a criterion of the decisions on
this point. 12 Yale Law Journal, 253, 459.
